Responses to Growing Unemployment and Mismatch between Skills and Job Openings in EU Member States

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Introduction

The financial crisis has led to an employment crisis in Europe. For long, levels of unemployment have varied between European Union (EU) member states, but in the last couple of years we have seen both unexpected high increase in unemployment in some countries as well as surprisingly low increase in others. In this paper we are in this respect focussing on responses towards increasing unemployment in Denmark and Germany. The rate of unemployment has increased rather rapidly in Denmark while German unemployment levels have remained stable throughout the present crisis. Within the framework of the flexicurity debate we will describe and analyse differences in the Danish and German responses towards the employment crisis.

Even though effects of the financial crisis and growing unemployment is high on the European agenda, it is also evident that in the longer run demographic changes, technological developments and a changing global division of labour will create different challenges. A key-challenge will be to secure the match between the qualifications of the European work force with the job openings of the future. These challenges will be addressed in the end of the paper.

Variations in Unemployment Increase

Unemployment levels vary quite significantly throughout the European Union (EU). This pattern of unemployment has been well known for many years. Unemployment levels have tended to be relatively high in parts of Southern Europe (Spain, Greece, etc.) and parts of Central and Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, etc.). Contrary to this unemployment levels have been fairly low in the Western and Northern part of Europe (The Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, etc.). Since the financial crisis hit the real economy and then subsequently led to reductions in employ-

ment, increases in unemployment have shown a different pattern than the one just described. Figure 1 depicts both the unemployment rate as well as the changes in the unemployment rates since the beginning of the crisis. The dark coloured countries are the ones with the higher unemployment levels and at the same time countries that have experienced high increases in unemployment levels – cf. the black spots. These include Spain (19%/+11pp)[1], Ireland (13%/+9pp), Slovakia (14%/+5pp), Lithuania (16%+12pp), Latvia (22%/+16pp) and Estonia (16%/+12pp). In other words these EU Member States have faced considerable increases in unemployment.

Figure 1: Unemployment rate in February 2010 and increase in the rate since the start of the crisis in the EU27 by Member State, seasonally adjusted



Source: Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 20/2010

However, we ought to exclude Slovakia as the increase we find here – just around 5pp - is not that different from what we find in a number of other European states. These states include among others Bulgaria, Hungary, The Czech Republic and Denmark. In the beginning of 2008 Denmark had

[1] The first figure is the unemployment rate in February 2010, the second is the difference between the highest and the lowest rate observed since the beginning of the crisis (in percentage points – pp). The months of the highest and the lowest rate observed are determined individually for each Member State (EU).

the second lowest unemployment rate in the EU. Nevertheless, the Danes experienced a steep increase in unemployment over the subsequent two years. This development is in stark contrast to what has happened on the neighbouring German labour market over the same period. German unemployment levels have been relatively high in recent years with a peak around 10 % in 2005 and then a decrease towards 2008. Accordingly, unemployment levels were almost identical in the two countries in February 2010, just around 7.5%. Still, the increase in unemployment in Denmark was above 4pp since the beginning of the crisis while the raise on the German labour market stayed at a modest 0,5pp.

As Danish labour market regulation and especially the so-called Danish flexicurity model has been promoted by not least the European Commission as a role model for Europe, the poor performance of the Danish labour market has been a somewhat unpleasant surprise. In the following we shall explore in detail potential explanations for this considerable difference in ability to maintain the level of employment in respectively Denmark and Germany.

Responses to growing unemployment

Talking generally about responses towards growing unemployment in Europe include a wide range of policy initiatives. First of all most initiatives have been aiming at supporting employment levels indirectly, meaning that they have primarily aimed to facilitate companies access to finance, and to increase the competitiveness of companies through various forms of financial support packages. Focussing on initiatives which directly support employment we can roughly identify three groups of initiatives. They include, *firstly*, measures of a 'preventive' character in that they aim to keep people in employment by, for example, supporting companies or providing income support for workers who have accepted reduced working time or pay-cuts to safeguard their jobs. *Secondly*, measures to create employment meaning instruments that promote the transitions from unemployment to employment. And *thirdly*, income support for unemployed people and those who are outside the labour force[2].

In this context we are going to have a more narrow focus on what has characterised the responses towards the employment crisis in Denmark and Germany. It can be argued that the Danish and Ger-

[2] For further details see EUCSS booklet, *EU-China High Level Roundtable on Social Security, 2009* p. 294.

man policies in this area illustrate two distinct forms of responses; external flexicurity versus internal flexicurity.

How do we define flexicurity?

We need to have a more precise understanding or definition of what we mean by 'flexicurity'. Obviously the concept 'flexicurity' is a contraction of the words 'flexibility' and 'security'. The concept has been defined in a number of ways, but by and large flexicurity denotes labour markets – or forms of labour market regulation – which at the same time manage to demonstrate or provide *flexibility* in employment regulation to the benefit of companies and at the same time *security* for employees in the sense that they can have an income (a job) or a reasonable economic compensation (e.g. unemployment benefit) if they have no income (job).

The definitions and understandings of what 'flexicurity' is and should include varies, but one of the most influential ones emphasises that flexicurity should be accompanied by a number of demands. *Firstly*, flexibility and security must not be developed in isolation or by coincidence, but must be the result of deliberate and synchronised efforts. *Secondly*, flexicurity must also include disadvantaged groups on the labour market, whether they are covered by collective agreements or not, and must thus not focus exclusively on labour market insiders. On this background flexicurity is defined as a policy strategy consciously striving "to enhance the flexibility of the labour markets, work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand"[3].

To analyse in more detail the direct and indirect trade-offs which form the basis of flexicurity, we can identify different forms of flexibility as well as different form of security. Departing from Danish and German labour market policies it is possible to identify two flexicurity strategies which in two distinct ways combine flexibility and security.

In the Danish case it is the combination of:

> *External numerical flexibility* (meaning the relatively easy access for companies to hire and fire employees) which is combined with *employment security* (meaning the certainty of re-

[3] Wilthagen, T. F. Tros & H. van Lieshot (2003): Towards 'flexicurity': balancing flexicurity and security in EU member states. Invited paper for the 13th World Congress of the IIRA , Berlin September 2003.

maining in work though not necessarily with the same employer). In the following this is referred to as *external flexicurity*.

In the German case it is the combination of:

Internal numerical flexibility (meaning flexible working hours, overtime, part-time work, etc.) combined with *job security* (meaning the certainty of retaining a specific job with a specific employer). In the following this is referred to as *internal flexicurity*.

In the following we will further elaborate what characteristics and content of the two flexicurity strategies.

External flexicurity

The external flexicurity of Danish labour market regulation is often referred to as the 'golden triangle' emphasising the interplay between three pillars of policies. *The first pillar* concerns the relatively flexible regulation of dismissals (c.f. figure 2). The OECD's *Employment Outlook 2004* included a so-called *Employment Protection Legislation index,* EPL index. The OECD index deals with the overall 'strictness' of EPL, which roughly equals the degree of employment protection. It is based on three different elements: regulation of various forms of fixed-term contracts, protection of regular employees against (individual) dismissal and special requirements in connection with collective dismissals. In this analysis Denmark is clearly placed in the share of the OECD countries with the lowest EPL level. In other words, with regard to the strictness of EPL Denmark is on the same level as countries like the Czech Republic, Japan and Hungary while countries like Norway and Sweden have a markedly higher degree of employment protection than Denmark. It is important to note that this flexible Danish regulation has been in place for decades and is directly linked to the fact that Danish industries is primarily characterised by small and medium sized companies. For decades it has been part of employers' policies to maintain the essentially easy access to lay-off workers. The explanation is that the relatively small companies only have limited possibilities of avoiding reductions in the workforce if demands decline. Contrary to large companies they have only limited possibilities to replace workers within the company if demands are dropping.

The relatively flexible character of Danish labour market regulation is also shown in the fact that almost one third of the Danish labour force move to a new job per year. This pattern is supported by

figures on average tenure of employees in Denmark compared to neighbouring countries; in 2000 the average tenure for Danish employees was 8.3 years. The equivalent figure for Sweden was 11.5 years[4].

Figure 2: External flexicurity - The Danish flexicurity model



Source: Madsen 2004[5]

The comparatively strong Danish trade union movement has for decades accepted this flexible regulation. However, their fundamental demand has been access to a comparatively generous unemployment benefit which consequently constitutes the *second pillar* in the Danish flexicurity regulation. How generous the unemployment benefits ought to be has been subject for on-going debates over the years. On the one hand trade unions want them to make up a fair compensation for the loss of employment. On the other hand employers and to some degree the government underlines that there should be a clear incentive for the individual unemployed person to seek a new job (c.f. the arrow in figure 2). In other words unemployment benefits should not be so generous that they might weaken the incentive of the unemployed to go back to work. It should be noted that the unemployment benefits are to a large degree state financed meaning that costs linked to dismissing workers has been externalised from the companies, and at the same time also is one element explaining the

[4] Peter Auer and Sandrine Cases (eds.) (2003), *Employment stability in an age of flexibility*. Geneva, ILO.
[5] Per Kongshøj Madsen, (2004) "The Danish model of 'flexicurity': experiences and lessons", *TRANSFER, European review of Labour Research*, Vol. 10 (2), pp. 187-207.

high level of taxation in Denmark. Still, it should be remembered that the overall labour market regulation includes, not at least from the trade union side, a strong attention towards unfair dismissals ensuring that employers do not exploit the flexible regulation. A relatively high number of employees face temporarily unemployment in Denmark. However, existing statistics tells us that the by far larger part of the unemployed will be able to find a new job within few weeks. This again emphasises the high level of job turnover. The high level of job turnover is also one of the key explanations why the number of long term unemployed is relatively low in Denmark, even during the present crisis.

The third pillar in the regulation is also important for understanding trade union acceptance of the system; the active labour market policies (Active LPM). The aim of theses policies is to up-skill or re-skill unemployed persons to enhance their possibilities of getting a new job. In other words these policies are aimed at persons who are not able to find a new job within few weeks of unemployment. At the same time the active measures have a motivational effect as many unemployed rather go back to a normal job than some form of activation (c.f. the arrows in figure 2). It should be noted that the active policies, that is various forms of courses, training and individual guidance are costly. Taken together Danish expenditure on passive labour market measures (e.g. unemployment benefits) and active labour market measures sums up to nearly 5 per cent of GDP; the highest in Europe[6].

In sum the Danish regulation is characterised by high 'external numerical flexibility' via a flexible regulation of dismissals. However, this policy is combined with high 'income security' (relatively generous unemployment benefits) and a relatively high 'employment security' via an active labour market policy. The test of the model is the ability to offer unemployed persons new jobs.

The Danish government – to a very high degree supported by employers' associations and trade unions - has introduced very few specific responses towards the rather rapidly growing unemployment. The basic philosophy has been that in a system based on what we here term *external flexicurity*, we should expect a relatively steep raise in the level of unemployment as the crisis hits the real economy. Further, the idea is that companies which are not competitive on the international markets should not be kept in business via various forms of state subsidies. In stead there should be a proc-

[6] OECD; *Employment Outlook 2004.*

ess of 'creative destruction' where non-competitive companies close down or reduce their work-force leading to a re-direction of investments creating new businesses and thereby new workplaces. Over the last two to three decades this policy – very much based on external flexicurity – has been successful. A number of industries have by and large disappeared; e.g. textile, shoe-making and ship-building. In stead we have seen the raise of new industries like bio-tech and medical industries and a variety of business service industries. And accordingly, as shown above, this led to record low levels of unemployment only a couple of years ago.

In spite of these experiences it seems to be a relevant question whether the continuingly strict focus on *external flexicurity* is an adequate response to the present crisis – the financial crisis. We will return to that question below.

Internal Flexicurity

Contrary to the Danish development the German government decided to launch a quite substantial response towards raising unemployment. This happened first and foremost via expanding the coverage of their short-time work scheme (*Kurzarbeit*). Coverage was expanded from 6 to 18 months in 2008 and in spring 2009 with additional 6 months so that the scheme now offers state financed wage compensation up to 24 months. Consequently, the number of workers sheltered by the scheme more or less exploded during the winter 2008/2009 to more than 1.4 million workers in June 2009. Since then the number has been reduced as the German economy has regained some pace. In spring 2010 approximately one million workers employed in roughly 60.000 companies were supported by the scheme. Wage compensations in this scheme cover up to 67 percent of normal pay, but often this will be topped-up by company agreements on further wage compensation. The average reduction in working time among workers on the short-time scheme was approximately 30 percent and the schemes were primarily used in the manufacturing sector[7].

The expanded use of short-time work schemes can be seen as a prominent example of *internal numerical flexibility* meaning that workers will be kept within the company in spite of lacking demands. This increases *job security* meaning the possibility to stay in one specific workplace. This illustrates the *internal flexicurity* in contrast to the external flexicurity in the Danish case described above.

[7] Federal Employment Service, 2010.

However, other tools also seem to have been important in enhancing the internal flexicurity in German companies. A recent survey suggests that the use of working time accounts in order to cut costs have been even more wide spread than the short-time work. The working time accounts are individual accounts where the employee can accumulate working hours. This has proved to be a major instrument for flexible working time arrangements. The survey showed that 30 percent of the companies had made use of working time accounts. Only 20 percent informed that they had introduced short-time work[8].

A number of other initiatives in German labour market regulation confirm the focus on strengthening the internal flexicurity. Even these initiatives to a large degree concern various forms of adjustment of working time. Some are the well-known tools like the reduction of overtime work and the increased use of part-time work. New elements include the shortening of the agreed working time in the collective agreements and new possibilities for reducing receivable hours on the working time accounts. Further, linked to the short-time work scheme the German government revived a scheme introduced during the German reunification known as 'training instead of dismissals'. The scheme subsidizes training during hours not worked for workers covered by short-time work. 130.000 workers began training under the scheme between January and November 2009[9].

It has been estimated that the use of short-time working schemes and the depletion of positive balance of working time accounts accumulated before the crisis have saved about 1.2 million jobs between 2008 and 2009[10]. This has paved the way for the argument that Germany is experiencing an employment miracle. While many other European countries have seen more or less severe increases in unemployment levels, and this includes both large economies like UK, Italy and France as well as smaller economies like Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, the level of German employment appears remarkably stable.

[8] Eironline (2010) *Germnay: Working time accounts and short-time work used to maintain employment*.
[9] Peter Auer (2010), *Does flexicurity work in economic crisis?* Paper presented at the IIRA Congress in Copenhagen, June 28-July 1, 2010.
[10] Herzog-Stein, A and Hartmut Seifert (2010), *Deutsches "Beschäftgungswunder" und flexible Arbeitszeiten.* Discussion paper 169, Düsseldrof: WSI.

External versus internal flexicurity – experiences so far

In a system like the Danish based on *external flexicurity*, that is the relatively easy access to hire and fire workers, it is to be expected that an economic crisis will lead to a rather steep increase in unemployment. Hence job security is low, however, the *employment security* is high as long as workers are able to find a new job with a new employer. Accordingly, the test of this system is the ability via entrepreneurship and a high level of mobility on the labour market to raise investments for new companies, and new jobs, to be established. In spite of previous positive experiences this has not happened in the present crisis. The steep raise in unemployment did happen in the early stages of the crisis while it is hard to identify traces of quick recovery. It can be argued that it is too early to judge the external flexicurity system; we have to see the outcomes of a full circle of crisis and recovery.

However, evidence from Germany suggests that companies for good reasons have preferred reduction of working hours to dismissals, via the various schemes described above, because the crisis primarily struck the export industries where we find a large number of skilled workers. These skilled workers, often core-workers, represent an important human capital for the companies therefore in strictly economic terms it makes sense to avoid lay-offs. Furthermore, the present crisis is embedded in the financial crisis. In other words this has not been a production-crisis, but rather a crisis triggered by the stifling of the financial markets. Based on this observation it has probably been a favourable strategy to try to hold on to qualified manpower in spite of rapidly decreasing demands.

Due to the Danish system based on the external flexicurity, Danish companies might have been forced to lay-off workers in early phases of the crisis, and might now find themselves at the doorstep of costly processes of (re)employing qualified workers. Still, it should be mentioned that even though the Danish system in the flexicurity debate has been highlighted as a system based on external numerical flexibility, there are also elements in Danish regulation that concerns the internal numerical flexibility or internal flexicurity. This includes flexible working time arrangements.

In 1995 a first flexibilisation of working time arrangements was introduced via the collective bargaining. At that time, the weekly working hours could vary over a six-week period, so that the aver-

age working week amounted to 37 hours over this six-week period. In the 1995 agreement this reference period was extended to six months, provided that the employers and trade unions representatives locally, i.e. the management and the shop steward, could reach an agreement on the organisation of the working time. This change was met with grave concern from both trade unions and employers. The unions worried that the employees at times would be pressurised into accepting a heavier workload, whereas the worry on the part of the employers was that the demand for local agreement would in reality rob the employers of part of their management prerogative. But in spite of these concerns, already in 1998 the reference period was extended to 12 months, which is also the period valid under the present agreement (2010-2012).

Additional flexibility in the organisation of working time was written into a pilot scheme included in the collective agreement of 2004. This scheme loosened the demand for local agreement on variation of the working time; a local agreement between the management and the shop stewards was still required, but the agreement could now be a framework agreement under which the specific organisation of working hours could be agreed directly with the individual employee or groups of employees. This very nearly amounts to an individualisation of the working time; but it is still contained within the framework of the collective bargaining system. In the 2007 renewal of the collective agreements the pilot scheme was transferred to permanent regulation. This means that collective agreements have provided Danish employers with quite a large degree of internal flexibility regarding working arrangements. Compared to the German situation the missing link has been the quite costly economic subsidies related to the short-time work scheme. In other words the Danish regulation does not hinder very flexible working time arrangements, but they are not supported by substantial state financed subsidies.

Summing up it is evident that the German internal flexicurity based system in the short and medium term has proved more efficient in safeguarding employment than the Danish external flexicurity based system. The very modest increase in German unemployment is hard to argue against. Moreover, recent figures indicate that the raise in German unemployment has peaked and might slowly decrease in the coming months. There might be a similar scenario for the development in unemployment in Denmark; meaning that the quick recovery is still absent.

Some questions can be raised regarding the long-term perspective. First of all, the German strategy is depending on a rather swift economic upturn followed by increased demands and subsequently the possibility of bringing workers back into full-time employment. If this does not happen, companies might eventually be forced to dismiss workers who have been included in the short-time work schemes, and other schemes of flexible working time. Still, in recent months the number of workers included in the schemes has been reduced without any increase in the over-all unemployment level.

Second, there is a risk that the job maintenance policies reduce the access of for instance young people to the labour market. So the policy of keeping the core-workers in the company in spite of lacking demands might jeopardise or at least delay the entrance of newcomers onto the labour market. Again, so far youth unemployment in German has not increased, but actually decreased slightly from 2009 to 2010. The demographic factor might be helpful here as the youth population is declining while larger groups of elderly workers are leaving the labour market.

A third comment is that Germany might face some structural challenges in the long run. Companies and jobs might have been saved during the present economic crisis. But structural changes continues to make an impact on German industries; i.e. the effects of technological development, changes in the global division of labour including the major trend of job increases within service industries and job decrease within manufacturing. The argument is that flexible working time arrangements and the maintenance of jobs might slow down unavoidable processes of restructuring. Later German industries might be forced to go thorough process of restructuring, downsizing and eventually lay-offs in order to adapt to these changes.

Potential Mismatch between Skills and jobs

No matter whether national responses to growing unemployment has been dominated by what we in this context has characterised as internal respectively external flexicurity, it appears as a common European challenge to secure the future match between skills and jobs. Consequently, European labour market policies are facing a complex challenge: On the one hand it is necessary in the short term to curb the rather high levels of unemployment one way or the other. On the other hand we are in the long term facing structural changes already indicated above.

Europe is going to see an ageing of the population. Eurostat has estimated that the EU working age population (15-64 years) will peak in 2012 and then start shrinking as the 'baby-boom' cohorts retire. At the same time it is anticipated that the participation rate of women and older workers will continue to increase. Therefore, the effective labour force should continue to grow slowly until 2020; beyond that year a continuous decline of total EU labour supply is expected. This expected development might indicate that present day concerns regarding unemployment should not be exaggerated, as the shrinking labour force beyond 2020 will lead to a lack of labour. However, figure 3 suggests that this will only be the case if European states take steps in order to secure that there will be a match between the qualifications of the European work force and the job openings.

Figure 3: Job openings between 2006 and 2020 by broad categories of occupations, EU 25



Source: Cedefop/*New Skills for New Jobs*, The European Commission 2009.

Evidently the net job creation projection shows a significant increase in high skilled non-manual occupations. It is estimated that up to 2010 an additional 17.7 million additional jobs could be created in occupations such as administrative, marketing, logistics and sales managers, IT system administrators, teaching professionals and technicians[11]. In order to secure that the right skills are available in the work force a quite significant effort is required concerning strengthening educational systems combined with guidance and incentives in order to attract young people to higher educations.

Meanwhile it is also emerges from figure 3 that a considerable net creation of elementary jobs is expected. These are jobs especially within the service sector like cleaning workers, security staff, domestic helpers, etc. In this sense we can expect a polarised job expansion for the coming decade

[11] *New Skills for New Jobs*, The European Commission 2009.

as the jobs in the middle so to speak, the skilled non-manual and especially the skilled-manual occupations, can be replaced by automation or outsourced. The polarisation of the labour market will in itself pose a challenge to educational and labour market policies in the future.

Above we have been focussing on internal and external flexicurity. The critical question has been how to either keep people in employment or secure re-employment of unemployed during a crisis. With regard to the task of ensuring that the existing qualifications in the work force meet the skills needs of the future, it seems evident that we need new analytical frameworks for understanding what might be positive dynamics of labour market regulation. Or to take the question even further; we need to include other policy areas, and in this case the educational systems.

First of all we need to go beyond unemployed and those who risk being (partly) unemployed and instead embrace the labour force as such. In order to do this we have launched the concept *mobication* (mobility and education). The basic argument is that the projected future trends reveals a need for a *high level of mobility* on the labour markets; meaning that workers to a high degree are able to move from one company to another, but it could also be from one functions to another within the same company. In order to make this possible it is necessary that workers have access to *flexible educational systems*. This is the possibility for employed persons to get access to education and training via flexible educational systems and after concluded training/further education being able to return to the high mobility labour market. This can be characterised as 'functional mobility' i.e. the ability to move to a new job/a new workplace; that is mobility within the labour market. But more than this *mobication* should also improve the access for various marginal groups to both the educational system as well as the labour market. We term this as 'transitional mobility'. Further, the transitional mobility also covers the transition of young people from school/education to the labour market.

It should be underlined that the passage from both one job to another and from job via education to a new job is depending on labour market demands as well as individual job motivation. Individual job-expectations including choice of education will have consequences for employment prospects. Linked to this it is important to note that state policies (support, benefits etc.) can play an important role in reaching a match between labour market demands and individual job motivation. Further, the

state can also encourage companies to support the further education and training among employees via tax policies, subsidies, etc[12].

Concluding remarks

Somewhat surprisingly unemployment levels have risen quite extensively in some European countries; among them Denmark. This indicates that at least in the short and medium term the *Danish external flexicurity system* have only to a very limited degree been able to bring unemployed workers back into employment. In contrast the *German system of internal flexicurity* based on the widespread use of short-time work schemes have resulted in only a very modest raise in unemployment. Questions can be raised regarding the long term effects of the two flexicurity systems; we need to see the full circle of crisis and recovery before we draw final conclusions.

It is important to note that both systems – external or internal flexicurity – includes a very costly 'security dimension' which in both the German and the Danish case is heavily relying on state funding. In Denmark state funding to a large degree covers passive measures (e.g. unemployment benefits) and active measures (training, courses, individual guidance, etc.). Following the lines of external flexicurity these security dimensions are targeted the unemployed person 'outside the door of the company'. In Germany state funding has first and foremost covered a large part of the costs of the short-time work schemes. Following the lines of the internal flexicurity this security dimension is aimed at the worker on reduced working time 'inside the door of the company'. It can be stated as a bottom line of both flexicurity policies that 'markets are imperfect' and state intervention or subsidies therefore are needed to cushion the effects of the crisis.

[12] For a further elaboration on mobication; see EUCSS booklet, *EU-China High Level Roundtable on Social Security, 2009* p. 294.

In spite of the present high levels of unemployment, Europe is confronting a challenge in matching the qualifications of the work force with future skills needs. A shrinking youth population and a clear need for more highly educated persons puts a special focus on the interplay between the educational systems and the labour market. A combined approach focussing on high mobility labour markets and flexible educational systems – mobication – might prove to be a useful analytical framework in this respect.