Slowing down Social Europe? The role of coalitions and decision-making arenas
Report 2 - the area of employee involvement
Research paper by Mikkel Mailand (December 2010)
This first empirical research paper in the project 'Slowing Down Social Europe?' analyses decision-making processes in the area of employee involvement. The research paper addresses the general research question ‘has the strengthening of the regulation-sceptical actors affected the content or the range of work and employment regulation at the EU-level?' as well as four sub-questions. The analysis has lead to six general observations:
First, although it is not possible to answer the main research questions drawing on the results from only one area of work and employment regulation, the two in-depth case stories nevertheless show that the pro-regulation forces are still strong enough - under the right conditions - to get new regulation adopted as well as to prevent the adoption of unwanted regulation, at least in the short term.
Second, new regulation can be problem-driven, as when new forms of employee involvement were introduced with the EWC Directive in 1994 and the information and consultation directive in 2001. However, new regulation can also be driven by the actors search for legitimacy, as both the EWC Directive revision and the attempt to establish a statute on EPC illustrates.
Third, this study of the employee involvement area illustrates the relatively well-known feature of the EU-level decision making, which is that proposals tend not to disappear when first introduced even though attempts to conclude regulation fails. Actors backing them up will always look for the next window of opportunity to put them ‘back on stage' and proposals can survive for decades. This is in many cases an advantage for the pro-regulation actors, but - as illustrated by the case of the EPC - it can sometimes be to the advantage of the regulation sceptical actors.
Fourth, especially as the adoption of the EWC Directive in 1994 illustrates, a change of the institutional framework can have important spill-over effects on the actors' strategic choices. Without the Maastricht Treaty's shift from demanding unanimity to only requiring a qualified majority on new regulation in (some) labour market issues, the regulation sceptical actors would have been in a position to uphold their resistance to the EWC Directive.
Fifth - and more directly linked to the sub-question on choice of decision-making arena - the brief historical description and the case-stories indicate that the choice between decision making arenas is first and foremost guided by the actors attempts to maximise outcomes compliant with their interest, more than it is guided by the need for direct policy control or for respecting traditions for using certain decision-making arenas. The revision of the EWC Directive especially illustrates a regime shopping game, where priorities for decision making arenas change fast. Traditions still matter, though, and can also be used in strategic argumentation - as in the case of the EPC initiative where the ETUC complained about the use of a multipartite rather than the tripartite arena for the consultation.
Six - and related to the sub-question on coalitions - the brief historical descriptions and the two case-stories shows, on the one hand, that solid coalitions cannot be seen in any of the decision-making processes analysed. For various reasons, a number of countries take stands that cannot be read off from their ‘usual' position within a pro-regulation or a regulation sceptical position that have been described in other studies. On the other hand, the ETUC and Business Europe take positions as expected in all cases, and so do a number of member states, most importantly the UK. Also, the Parliament and especially its Social and Employment Committee tend to act in accordance with one of the coalitions (the pro-regulation coalition). Hence, at this stage of the project, no solid conclusions regarding the role of the coalitions can be made.