Slowing down Social Europe? The role of coalitions and decision-making arenas

Report 3 - the employment policy area

Research paper by Mikkel Mailand (August 2011)

The present project, which theoretical and methodological framework is described in details in report 1, aims to explore whether the strengthening of the regulation-sceptical actors has affected the scope and content of regulation as well as the relative weight between different forms of regulation. The project also analyses the role coalitions between different actors has played.

Looking at the development of the employment policy area examples of successful attempts to slow down Social Europe in the employment policy area can be seen, but they are few. Regarding the range of the policy, the employment guidelines have been reduced in numbers during the years (gradually from the peak of 18 guidelines in 2002 to 4 in 2010), which in itself represents a weakening. However, this development is less dramatic when seen in the context of the attempts to streamline the strategies, which have also led to a diminished number of economic guidelines. Moreover, it is important to note that although the European Employment Strategy (EES) has been challenged at all three revisions (2002-03, 2005 and 2010) it has fared much better than expected by many. Still, the bottom-line is that the range of the employment policy in absolute terms - and to some extent also relative to the economic strategy - has been diminished over the years, and the employment policy now has a more subordinate position to the economic policy than 10 years ago. Focussing on the content of the employment policy there are few signs that a development in line with a weakening of Social Europe has taken place. The 2002 revision and the 2007 adoption of the flexicurity principles included so many concessions to the pro-regulation actors, that they could not be seen as weakening Social Europe. Likewise, the new 2020 strategy with the inclusion of the poverty issues (more than) balance the disappearance of the gender issue and other minor steps in the direction of weakening Social Europe. Taken together, although the changes of the scope and the content of European employment policy are important, the changes are much more limited than could be expected from the change in the power-relations between the actors.

Regarding the role of coalitions, coalitions seem to have played a more important role in the first half of the past decade (especially in the first revision of EES) than in the second half, where neither the common flexicurity principles nor the Europe 2020 activated the coalitions more than sporadically. One obvious explanation could be that the weakening of the pro-regulation actors has weakened the pro-regulation coalition too - and this to such an extent that it is not able to organise resistance. The enlargement with new member states has simultaneously blurred the picture somewhat, in that a number of these are not easily placed within the two coalitions, but has also strengthened the minimalist coalition, because the governments from the new member states on average tend to take more regulation sceptical positions than the old member states. Moreover, the enlargement has created a group of member states that so far have been less active and influential in the decision making process, but according to the interviewees, will become more active when they have been Presidents for the EU and ‘learned the game'. However, despite the weakening of the role of coalitions and of the pro-regulation coalition in particular, at least parts of the pro-regulation coalition played an important role in the amalgamation of the social OMCs in 2006, the change of the European flexicurity concept during the decision-making process 2006-07 and the inclusion of the poverty issue in Europe 2020. The coalitions have primarily been divided in their attitude to regulation - especially with regard to the range of this. Moreover, despite of the weakening of the pro-regulation actors, it has been possible to agree on new regulation in the employment policy area because part of the new regulation is not easy to place on the pro-contra regulation scale and because some actors have veto-points. An example of the first was the joint European flexicurity principles, whereas an example of the later is the Parliaments competence not to approve a Commission and its leader - this might be the single most important reason that the poverty issue was included in the Europe 2020 plan and its employment guidelines.

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